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three. Machina shows that four prominent theories of ambiguity aversion predict indifference between
the acts. Introspection, however, suggests that many people might very well strictly prefer one act over
the other. This paper makes four contributions: first, to our knowledge, it is the first to experimentally
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the certainty equivalent of an embedded lottery. Third, our results—across three experiments—indicate
non-indifference, which rejects earlier theories of ambiguity aversion, but is consistent with a newer one,
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indifference in the Machina paradox, and thereby explains why so many models predict indifference.
JEL Codes: D81
Keywords: Ellsberg paradox, Machina paradox, uncertainty aversion, independence axiom
∗Daniel L. Chen, daniel.chen@iast.fr, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study
in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France; dchen@law.harvard.edu, Labor Work-
life Program, Harvard Law School; Martin Schonger, mschonger@ethz.ch, ETH Zurich, Center for
Law and Economics. First draft: February 2014. Current draft: October 2016. Most recent version
at: http://users.nber.org/∼dlchen/papers/Testing_Axiomatizations_of_Ambiguity_Aversion.pdf. Previ-
ous drafts circulated as, “Ambiguity Aversion with Three Outcomes: Comment, Experimental Evidence,
and the Independence Axiom.” For helpful remarks about his thought experiment in relation to our paper
we thank Mark Machina and Peter Wakker. For comments we thank seminar participants at ETH Zurich,
the University of Zurich, the Foundations of Utility and Risk 2014 conference, and the Social Choice and
Welfare 2014 conference. We would like to thank Stefan Bucher and Michal Zator for excellent research
assistance. Work on this project was conducted while Chen received financial support from the European
Research Council (Grant No. 614708), Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant Nos. 100018-152678 and
106014-150820), and Agence Nationale de la Recherche.
1
1 Introduction
The development of the normative and positive theory of behavior under uncertainty is
characterized by a series of thought experiments to which scholars or laypersons often give
a “wrong” answer. This is why these thought experiments are often referred to as paradoxes.
The first thought experiment, the St.-Petersburg-Paradox, was proposed by Nicolas Bernoulli
(see de Montmort, 1713) and challenged the notion that a lottery will be evaluated by
its expected value. Daniel Bernoulli (1738) suggested a theory to accommodate observed
behavior by using a concave utility function instead of the payoffs themselves. Centuries
later that theory of using a real-valued function of the outcomes was put on normative
foundations by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944). Allais (1953) then challenged that
theory, proposing a thought experiment demonstrating that many people do not exhibit the
behavior suggested by Bernoulli and von Neumann and Morgenstern.
Expected utility theory concerns situations where a probability distribution is exogenously
given. Savage (1954) proposed to expand this theory to situations where no probability
distribution is given, and formulated axioms that imply that a decision-maker would have a
single subjective probability distribution and follow expected utility theory. Ellsberg (1961)
proposed a thought experiment that challenges the notion that decision-makers have a single
subjective probability distribution (i.e., are probabilistically sophisticated). Empirical papers
followed (for a survey see Camerer and Weber, 1992), showing that there is a “paradox,” (i.e.,
that people behave differently than probabilistic sophistication prescribes). New models were
proposed to accommodate the behavior observed in the Ellsberg experiment (e.g., exhibiting
ambiguity non-neutrality).
These new models were designed to accommodate ambiguity aversion, or behavior that
might be seen as Ellsberg-paradoxical. Thus, no conceivably observable behavior in the Ells-
berg experiment can falsify these new models. Machina (2014) lists four major such models:
Schmeidler’s (1989) Choquet model (or Rank-Dependent Utility); Gilboa and Schmeidler’s
(1989) maximin expected utility; the smooth ambiguity model by Klibanoff et al. (2005);
and the Variational Preferences Model by Maccheroni et al. (2006). Machina’s thought ex-
periment is a test of these four theories: Machina proposes two acts, and these four models
all predict indifference between the two Machina acts. Models which might not necessarily
predict indifference are Segal’s (1987) recursive ambiguity model in combination with Gul’s
(1991) disappointment aversion1, and Gul and Pesendorfer’s (2010) Expected Uncertain Util-
ity Theory.
1See Dillenberger and Segal (2015)
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In the classic Ellsberg urns, there are two, three, or four states, but never more than two
outcomes. Machina (2014) proposes acts with three outcomes, and proceeds to show that
four major theories of ambiguity predict indifference between the two acts he constructs. An
urn contains 3 balls, exactly 1 of which is red, while the other two could be both white, both
black, or one white and one black ball. The outcomes in this Machina thought experiment
are monetary prizes of $0, $c and $100, where $c ∼ (1
2
, $0; 1
2
, $100), the certainty equivalent
of the lottery of receiving $100 with probability 50% and else $0.
Act 1 Act 2
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $c
Red
$100
Red
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$c $100
Figure 1: Machina experiment
According to Machina, “If ambiguity aversion somehow involves ‘pessimism,’ mightn’t an
ambiguity averter have a strict preference for [Act] II over [Act] I, just as a risk averter might
prefer bearing risk about higher rather than lower outcome levels?”
In this paper, we carefully implement the Machina test to see if people violate indifference,
and if so, whether this is an economically substantial phenomenon. We find that people
do violate indifference—sytematically across three experiments for over 700 subjects—but
violate indifference in the opposite manner than what Machina hypothesized. To the best
of our knowledge, this paper is the first one to experimentally employ the Machina thought
experiment.2 It also discusses the Machina thought experiment and shows that for decision-
makers who satisfy independence (we make precise which independence axiom we mean), the
Machina thought experiment is problematic. Finally, we explain the direction of the violation
of indifference using Dillenberger and Segal (2015).
To preview the theoretical observation regarding independence, replace $c with the lottery
it is induced by, so the original Machina choice becomes:
2Machina also proposed earlier thought experiments in Machina (2009). Machina distinguishes his 2014
thought experiment, which is based on a single source of purely subjective uncertainty, unlike Machina
(2009), which is based on two. Baillon et al. (2011) and L’Haridon and Placido (2010) theoretically and
empirically investigated Machina’s earlier thought experiment, though the empirical tests did not control for
indifference. Their results complement ours, and together, advance the argument that Machina’s paradoxes
falsify many ambiguity theories, at least in the Anscombe-Aumann framework adopted by those theories
with the independence axiom as central.
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Act 1 Act 2
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls
1
2
1
2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $0
$0 $100
Red
$100
$100
1
2
1
2
Red
$0
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $100
$100 $100
Figure 2: Machina experiment and reduction
Note that $0 occurs with one-third probability and $100 occurs with one-third probability.
That is, once we substitute the certainty equivalent c with the underlying lottery, the lot-
teries are now identical in their objective and subjective aspects. Thus, a problem with the
Machina thought experiment is its interpretation, namely, does a finding of a strict preference
show that ambiguity aversion varies in wealth, or does it show a violation of reduction? By
reduction, we mean that a decision-maker is indifferent to replacing the certainty equivalent
as the prize by its underlying lottery.
2 Machina thought experiment
In Machina’s thought experiment, major theories of ambiguity aversion predict indifference,
so the thought experiment is posed as a test of these theories. We make two observations.
First, probabilistically sophisticated non-Expected Utility (non-EU) decision makers (DM)
can fail to be indifferent. We present an example (disappointment aversion) where decision
makers have a strict preference. Second, any non-probabilistically sophisticated Expected
Utility decision maker is indifferent. We show that for any prior, someone who satisfies the
independence axiom will be indifferent. Machina’s thought experiment appears at least as
much a test of independence as of ambiguity aversion.
2.1 Example of probabilistically sophisticated DM with ActI  ActII Let the
probabilistic sophisticated DM have: pB = 23 , pW = 0. Then, suppose the DM has non-EU
Gul’s (1991) disappointment aversion (β > 0). Then, for any lottery with 2 outcomes x < x
Gul’s functional is simply: v(lottery) = (1+β)p(x)u(x)+p(x)u(x)
1+βp(x)
. Normalize u(0) = 0, u(100) =
100. Then, u(c) =v($0; 1
2
, $100; 1
2
) =
1
2
100
1+ 1
2
β
= 100
2+β
. Next, v(I) = (1+β)
2
3
u(0)+ 1
3
u(100)
1+β 2
3
= 100
3+2β
and
v(II) =
(1+β) 1
3
u(0)+ 2
3
u(c)
1+β 1
3
= 2u(c)
3+β
= 200
(2+β)(3+β)
. Thus v(II) < v(I)⇒ Act I  Act II.
2.2 Non-probabilistically sophisticated EU DM with Act I ∼ Act II Machina
proposes acts with three outcomes. First, the purely objective act is:
4
Act 0
1 ball 1 ball 1 ball︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
White
$c
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Red
$100
Then, he proposes two acts that have ambiguity either at the lower two outcomes or at
the higher two outcomes:
Act L Act H
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $c
Red
$100
Red
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$c $100
Now consider 2 acts that are constructed by replacing the certainty equivalent in the
Machina Acts with the underlying lottery. Note that the acts have an identical mapping
from states to outcomes. This inspires our later claim that the Anscombe-Aumann axiom
of Substitution together with Ordering (completeness and transitivity) and the classical
independence axiom from expected utility theory are sufficient to imply indifference between
Machina’s acts L and H.
Act L’ Act H’
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls
1
2
1
2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
black white
$0 $0
$0 $100
︷ ︸︸ ︷
red
$100
$100
1
2
1
2
︷ ︸︸ ︷
red
$0
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
black white
$0 $100
$100 $100
2.3 The Machina Acts in the Anscombe-Aumann Framework The Machina
acts have both subjective events and objective ones, which is why we can represent them in
the framework by Anscombe and Aumann (1963). We follow the exposition by Machina and
Schmeidler (1995):
X = {..., x, ...} set of outcomes (e.g., money)
S = {..., s, ...} set of states
R = (x1, p1; ...;xm, pM) a roulette lottery (purely objective)
H = [x1 on E1; ...;xn on En] horse race (purely subjective)
HR = [R1 on E1; ...;Rn on En] horse race (purely subjective)
L = {...,L,...} the combined set of all pure roulette, pure horse, and horse/roulette lotteries
Thus in our context we have:
5
The set of outcomes is X = {0, c, 100}.
The prize c is implicitly defined by c ∼ (1
2
; 0, 1
2
; 100).
2.4 State space: balls in urn Machina uses as the state space which balls are in the
urn, thus S = {BB,BW,WB,WW}.
Act 0 (purely objective):
[(1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100)on all states]
Act L (ambiguity at low outcomes):[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on BB; (1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on BW,WB;(2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on WW
]
Act H (ambiguity at high outcomes)[
(1
3
;0,2
3
;c) on BB; (1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on BW,WB;(1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100) on WW
]
Act L’ = Act H’:[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on BB; (1
2
; 0, 1
2
; 100) on BW,WB;(1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100) on WW
]
2.5 State space: ball drawn Instead of using as the state space which balls are in
the urn, it might be more natural to think of the state as the ball drawn. Here the difficulty
is that the ball drawn mixes objective and subjective events. Thus, we can think of the
subjective state space as which ball is drawn conditional on that ball not being red, that is,
have S = {B,W}. Another way of thinking about this is that as the red ball is taken out of
the urn, one ball is drawn from the urn (horse race), and then a roulette wheel is spun where
one third of the fields are red, whereas the rest of the fields have no color but, say, look at
the color of the ball drawn from the urn. This approach has the advantage of yielding far
shorter expressions, as it has 2 states instead of 4.
Act 0 (purely objective):
[(1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100)on all states].
Act L (ambiguity at low outcomes):[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on B; (2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) on W
]
Act H (ambiguity at high outcomes):[
(2
3
;c,1
3
;0) on B; (2
3
; 100, 1
3
; 0) on W
]
Act L’ and H’:[
(2
3
;0,1
3
;100) on B; (1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100) on W
]
2.6 Informational Symmetry We assume that the DM treats the events B and W
as informationally symmetric.
Ensuring or assuming information symmetry is particularly important in the context of the
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Machina acts, as White yields a strictly higher prize in both acts. Informational symmetry
means pw = pB in the ball draw state space, and pBB = pWW in the ball in the urn state
space.
2.7 Indifference between the Machina Acts Under what conditions is a DM indif-
ferent between the Machina Acts? First, observe that by informational symmetry, pW = pB
(resp. pWW = pBB), but then the DM effectively views both L and H as the lottery
(1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100), and thus L ∼ H. But more interestingly, what about non-probabilistically
sophisticated decision-makers, when are they indifferent?
2.8 Two kinds of independence AsMachina and Schmeidler (1995) explain, Anscombe-
Aumann has four axioms, in which the first two, Ordering and Mixture Continuity are related
to nonstochastic consumer theory, while the latter two, Substitution and Independence, are
related to expected utility. All four together imply probabilistic sophistication (and expected
utility). Focus here on three of them, abstracting from Mixture Continuity, which we do not
need for present purposes.
Axiom (Ordering) % is a complete, reflexive and transitive binary relation on L .
The following is what Machina and Schmeidler (1995) name the Substitution Axiom, which
Anscombe and Aumann (1963) called the Monotonicity Axiom:
Axiom (Substitution Axiom) For any pair of pure roulette lotteries Pi and Ri: If Pi <
Ri then [P1 on E1; ..;P i on Ei; ..;P n on En] < [R1 on E1; ..;Ri on Ei; ..Rn on En] for all
partitions {E1, ..., En} and all roulette lotteries {R1, ..., Ri−1, Ri+1, ..., Rn}.
The next axiom of Anscombe-Aumann, is an independence axiom, but they generalized
it to apply to horse race/roulette lotteries, which is why we call it Horse-Race/Roulette-
Independence:
Axiom (Horse-Race/Roulette-Independence Axiom) For any partition {E1, ..., En} and
roulette lotteries {P1, ..., Pn} and {R1, ..., Rn}:
If [P1 on E1; ...;P n on En] < [R1 on E1; ...;Rn on En]
then [αP 1 + (1− α)Q1on E1; ...;αP n + (1− α)Qnon En]
< [αR1 + (1− α)Q1on E1; ...;αRn+(1− α)Qnon En]
for all probabilities α(0, 1] and all roulette lotteries {Q1, ..., Qn}.
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By contrast, the classical Independence Axiom (for pure roulette lotteries from expected-
utility theory) is the following, and for clarity, we call it Roulette-Independence:
Axiom (Roulette-Independence Axiom) For all pure roulette-lotteries R,P,Q, and all α(0, 1]
If R < P then αR + (1− α)Q < αP + (1− α)Q.
The Horse Race/Roulette-Independence Axiom implies the Roulette-Independence Ax-
iom, while the converse is not true. Indeed the Horse Race/Roulette-Independence Axiom
together with the other 3 Anscombe-Aumann axioms implies probabilistic sophistication,
while Roulette-Independence does not. Many major theories of ambiguity aversion (as they
are theories that allow for ambiguity non-neutrality) violate the Horse-Race/Roulette Inde-
pendence Axiom, but satisfy Roulette-Independence:
Remark The Multiple Priors, the Rank-Dependent Model, the Smooth Ambiguity Pref-
erences Model, and the Variational Preferences Model satisfy Roulette-Independence.
2.9 Roulette-Independence: Bernoulli without Bayes?
Claim A decision-maker who satisfies the Ordering, Roulette-Independence, and Substi-
tution Axioms is indifferent between Act L and Act H.
Proof: We prove this separately in both state spaces:
1. State space: Balls in Urn:
By Roulette-Independence, we have (1
3
; 0, 1
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (1
3
;0,2
3
;c), and (2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100).
But then the Substitution Axiom implies that L ∼ H, since one can substitute these lotteries
on BB and WW , respectively.
2. State space: Ball Drawn:
By Roulette-Independence, we have (2
3
; 0, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (2
3
;c,1
3
;0), and (2
3
; c, 1
3
; 100) ∼ (1
3
; 0, 2
3
; 100).
But then the Substitution Axiom implies that L ∼ H, since one can substitute these lotteries
on B and W respectively. Q.E.D.
2.10 Indifference between subjective and objective lottery? Note that Substi-
tution and Roulette-Independence, unlike probabilistic sophistication, do not imply indif-
ference between the horse-race/roulette lotteries L and H on the one hand, and the pure
roulette lottery that is Act 0:
Example (Multiple Priors) Let us use a simple version of the multiple priors model. Let
the priors be p1W = 0 and p2W = 1. The DM evaluates each Act by the expected utility
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that nature chooses the worst prior for her. We normalize her Bernoulli utility function with
u(0) = 0, u(100) = 100, which implies u(c) = 50. Thus, the DM evaluates the acts as follows:
V (Act 0) = 1
3
0 + 1
3
c + 1
3
100 = 50, V (Act L) = min
{
2
3
0 + 0· c+ 1
3
100, 0· 0 + 2
3
· c+ 1
3
100
}
=
331
3
, V (Act H) = min
{
1
3
0 + 2
3
· c+ 0· 100, 1
3
0 + 0· c+ 2
3
· 100} = 331
3
. Thus, while the DM
satisfies Roulette-Independence, she still is ambiguity averse as: Act 0  Act L ∼ Act H.
What about our illustrative Acts L’ and H’? Under Substitution and Independence, we
have: Act L’ ∼ Act L ∼ Act H.
3 Experiment 1
In the first experiment, we replaced $c with the lottery it is induced by, and asked indi-
viduals to choose an urn (lottery). For the purposes of the results discussion and continuity
with the theoretical discussion, we refer to Act L’ (ambiguity at low outcome) and Act H’
(ambiguity at high outcome). The labeling of the urns with “A” and “B” in the instructions
were chosen arbitrarily for the subjects.
A design choice was the number of balls to put in the urn. Machina parsimoniously fills his
opaque urn with 1 known and 2 unknown balls. Experience shows that then some subjects
assume some symmetric objective probability distribution is implied, and they mechanically
start calculating the resulting distribution of this compound lottery. We avoid this by having
20 known and 40 unknown balls. This serves three purposes. First, it makes the mechanical
thoughtless calculation harder. Second, it makes examples better for the experimenter, “for
example, 7 black and 33 white balls”. Third, Ellsberg also proposed a large number of balls.
We recruited 213 participants on Amazon Mechanical Turk and implemented a test on
SurveyGizmo. Caution is warranted when interpreting these results as the instructions had
several shortcomings: the labeling and order of the lotteries was not randomized, and there
were minor wording issues; see the participant screen (Figure 3). Act L’ was chosen by 123
participants (58%). A two-sided t-test rejects the null hypothesis that this preference for Act
L’ is random, at a significance level of 5% (p = 0.0234).
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Figure 3
A second recruitment of 432 subjects participated in the Machina thought experiment.
This time, the labeling and order of the urns (lotteries) were randomized. We used oTree
(Chen et al. 2014).
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Figure 4: Choice of lottery
Among these 432 subjects, 64% preferred Act L’. We also had demographic characteristics
for 333 subjects. In linear probability models, Republicans were 22 percentage points more
likely to prefer Act L’. Americans were 48 percentage points and Asians were 27 percentage
points more likely to prefer Act H’. Marginal effects from logit and probit models were similar.
We did not see significant differences in choice of ambiguity at high or low outcomes by
gender (which is the focal demographic heterogeneity of a recent study on gender differences
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in ambiguity aversion (Borghans et al. 2009)).3
3Cross-cultural differences in ambiguity aversion has been less examined relative to the literature on
demographic predictors of risk aversion (Weber and Hsee 1998; Von Gaudecker et al. 2011), so we do not
delve into these differences further, though readers may find demographic determinants of ambiguity aversion
to be of interest.
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(1) (2)
chooseA chooseA
Mean dep. Var. 0.36 0.37
Male 0.0564
(0.0559)
Age 0.00200
(0.00249)
Republican -0.215**
(0.102)
Democrat -0.0398
(0.0842)
American 0.475*
(0.280)
Indian 0.438
(0.290)
Black 0.112
(0.120)
Hispanic 0.116
(0.116)
Native American -0.0419
(0.173)
Asian 0.270**
(0.107)
Hindu 0.0489
(0.115)
Catholic -0.0594
(0.0934)
Religious Services 0.00468
(0.0218)
Constant 0.359*** -0.260
(0.0231) (0.291)
N 432 333
R-sq 0.000 0.107
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.10  ** p<0.05  *** p<0.01
Correlates of Urn A Choice
Figure 5: Regression analysis
On the basis of the results described thus far, subjects appear to act in the opposite manner
of what Machina thought (“If ambiguity aversion somehow involves “pessimism,” mightn’t
an ambiguity averter have a strict preference for [Act] II over [Act] I, just as a risk averter
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might prefer bearing risk about higher rather than lower outcome levels?”). That is, across
645 individuals, on average, ambiguity at low outcomes was preferred to ambiguity at higher
outcomes.
4 Experiment 2
4.1 Design The main challenge in experimental implementation of the Machina thought
experiment is that one of the three monetary outcomes employs the certainty equivalent (CE)
of the lottery that grants monetary prizes of 0 respectively ω(= 100) with equal probabili-
ties. If a decision-maker has a preference relation which satisfies continuity, then a certainty
equivalent is guaranteed to exist; strict monotonicity in the monetary outcomes ensures
uniqueness. However, the certainty equivalent of a subject is unknown to the experimental
economist. Normatively, there are strong reasons to be risk-neutral at small stakes (Rabin
2003), but positively, past studies have shown that most people exhibit risk-aversion.
Thus, it is inappropriate to assume ω
2
for the certainty equivalent - that value can at
most serve as an upper bound. Thus, the experimenter has to elicit the subject’s certainty
equivalent prior to conducting the Machina thought experiment. This also assumes that the
elicitation itself leaves the certainty equivalent unchanged, an assumption which could be
violated, for example, with an income effect.
The state-of-the-art method to experimentally elicit willingness to pay for an object is still
Becker et al. (1964). However, as Karni and Safra (1987) show, if that object is a lottery,
then the elicitation method will yield the correct result generally only if the decision-maker
satisfies the independence axiom. Note that the independence axiom can be thought of
as describing behavior under objective uncertainty, and it is indeed possible to satisfy the
independence axiom and to be ambiguity averse at the same time.
The BDM-mechanism, in turn, can be implemented by two methods: the mechanism it-
self and a simplified “list” method. In the mechanism, people are asked to state their true
valuation, a price is randomly drawn, and they receive the object at the random price if
their stated valuation is above it. In the “list” method, people are presented with a list of
choices, each consisting of two options, the object and a valuation, and one of the indicated
choices is then selected at random. From a formal point of view, the two are close cousins,
the difference being that in the list method the valuation one can state is quite coarse.
Practically, however, there are bigger differences: in the list method, participants may
frame each choice as separate, and not view themselves as confronting a big lottery, thus
even if independence does not hold, the mechanism would work. The mechanism itself is
also quite unusual for non-economists and it is far from obvious to subjects that truth-
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telling is a dominant strategy. Thus, usually subjects get the opportunity to practice with
the mechanism and are explicitly told that correctly stating their true valuation is optimal.
This is a problem in our setting: we want to later use the elicited value to implement the
Machina paradox. Thus, it ceases to be optimal to state the true value, but rather overstating
it becomes optimal. Moreover, since the probability of receiving the certainty equivalent in
the Machina thought experiment is subjective, it is not possible to correct for that incentive.
For these reasons, we use the PRINCE method.
4.2 PRINCE The PRINCE (PRior INCEntive system) method is like the list method
and formally equivalent to BDM (Johnson, Baillon, Bleichrodt, Li, van Dolder, and Wakker
2015). In brief, the choice question (rather than a choice option) implemented for real is
randomly selected before (rather than after) the experiment. It is provided to the subjects in a
tangible form (for example in a sealed envelope). Subjects’ answers are framed as instructions
to the experimenter about the real choice implemented at the end. Incentive compatibility
can now be crystal clear, not only to homo economicus but also to homo sapiens, and isolation
is maximally salient. In the PRINCE method instead of $c, one asks subjects for instructions
for which lottery is preferred for all possible $c.
It has the advantage over the list method in that it allows any answer, not just an answer
on the list (so the valuations are not elicited coarsely). Also, the envelope is already there,
and framing as “give us instructions” might lessen concerns of subjects seeing this as a big
lottery when eliciting CE. To familiarize subjects with PRINCE, we first used it for a first
order stochastic dominance (FOSD) task and then for CE. For the Machina experiment, we
use a combination of PRINCE and the list method. Our reason for doing so is that it is a
priori not clear that people have a unique switching point nor direction.
Another design issue is that the original PRINCE method tests for the endowment ef-
fect—it uses mug vs. money choice to test for endowment effect—so monotonicity in money
implies that there is a threshold at which the money will be preferred. Thus, there, the in-
structions can take the simple form of a threshold: below $y, I want to keep mug, above $y, I
want money. The existence of such a threshold (and even directionality) is not obvious in the
Machina thought experiment. Here we ask what happens if, instead of $c, some 0 < x < 100
is used?
Assume that preferences are strictly monotonic in money. Note that then there should be
a certainty equivalent and it should fall between $0 and $100. Now, consider an arbitrary x
such that 0 < x < 100.
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Act 1 Act 2
2 balls 1 ball 1 ball 2 balls︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$0 $x
Red
$100
Red
$0
︷ ︸︸ ︷
Black White
$x $100
Figure 6: Machina experiment
4.2.1. Which preferences imply a threshold x?
A natural question is whether we can still make the argument that independence would
be a sufficient condition for DM to be indifferent between the lotteries. The answer to that
question is NO. An example to see why, consider the case of a small x close to 0, and a
subjective expected utility (SEU) decision-maker who believes that the probability of black
is zero and that of white is 2
3
. This decision maker will prefer Act II (which gives her
$100 with probability 2
3
) over Act I (which gives her $100 with probability 1
3
). Consider
the following simple example to show how people can switch: EU(I) = 1
3
100 + pWu(x) and
EU(II) = pW100 + pBu(x).
Example 1, pW = 0:
EU(I) = 1
3
100 and EU(II) = 2
3
u(x), thus Act I < Act II iff x < c
Example 2, pB = 0:
EU(I) = 1
3
100 + 2
3
u(x) and EU(II) = 2
3
100, thus Act II < Act I iff x < c
Example 3, pW = pB = 13 :
EU(I) = 1
3
100 + 1
3
u(x) and EU(II) = 1
3
100 + 1
3
u(x), thus Act I ∼ Act II for all x
4.2.2. Probabilistic sophistication and SEU
Slightly more generally, since SEU implies probabilistic sophistication, we assume that
p(White) = pw, where pb + pw = 23 , and assume u(0) = 0, u($100) = 1. Then u(c) =
1
2
and
0 < u(x) < 1. Then SEU(Act I) = pw · u(x) + 13 · 1 and SEU(Act II) = pb · u(x) + pw · 1.
Thus, the following holds:
for pw > pb :
for pw = pb = 13 :
for pw < pb :
Act I < Act II ⇔ x ≥ c
Act I ∼ Act II
Act I < Act II ⇔ x ≤ c
Thus, there might be indifference, or there might be a threshold in one direction or the
other.
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4.2.3. Probabilistic sophistication and RDU
Alternatively, under rank dependent utility (RDU), let the probability distortion/weighting
function be f . Given this belief,
RDEU(Act I) = f (pw) · 0 + (f (pw + pb)− f (pw)) · u(x) + (1− f (pw + pb)) · 1
= (f (pw + b)− f (pw)) · u(x) + 1− f (pw + pb)
and
RDEU(Act II) = f(1
3
) · 0 + (f (pw + 13)− f (13)) · u(x) + (1− f (pw + 13)) · 1
=
(
f
(
pw +
1
3
)− f (1
3
)) · u(x) + 1− f (pw + 13)
Thus, there are three cases:
for pw > pb :
for pw = pb = 13 :
for pw < pb :
Act I  Act II
Act I ∼ Act II
Act II  Act I
4.2.4. Non-probabilistically sophisticated beliefs/preferences
Since the event black always yields a worse outcome than the event white, in this situation
the multiple priors model is behaviorally identical to a model with probabilistic sophistication
and subjective probability of Black equal to 2
3
, that of White equal to 0. Thus, we are in the
case of pw < pb : Act I < Act II ⇔ x ≤ c.
4.3 Experiment Design
4.3.1. First order stochastic dominance task
The first task is the first order stochastic dominance task.
Figure 7: Envelope content - FOSD
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Figure 8: Answer sheet - FOSD
Note that first order stochastic dominance implies that option B is always preferred when
X is less than 7.
4.3.2. Certainty equivalent task
The second task is the CE task.
Figure 9: Envelope content - CE
Figure 10: Answer sheet - CE
Note that someone who is risk averse would write down X less than 10.
4.3.3. Machina task
The third task is the Machina task.
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Figure 11: Envelope content - Machina
Figure 12: Answer sheet - Machina
Note that someone who satisfies SEU would have a unique switching point when X is CE.
4.4 Baseline Results We ran the experiment in Zurich. We begin our analysis with a
presentation of the number of participants who fall into different categories: (i) switch from
Ambiguity at Low to Ambiguity at High, (ii) switch from Ambiguity at High to Ambiguity
19
at Low, (iii) always choose Ambiguity at Low, (iv) always choose Ambiguity at High, (v)
always indifferent, and (vi) other.
Figure 13: All participants
A few results emerge from the tabulation. First, many people do not switch. Second,
there is a slight greater preference for ambiguity at low outcomes than for ambiguity at
high outcomes (this echoes the findings from Experiment 1). Third, switchers switch from
ambiguity at low to ambiguity at high as X increases. In the final sub-section, we present a
model that explicates this result.
Next, we restrict to participants with a reasonable certainty equivalent (i.e., between 4 and
10, inclusive).
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Figure 14: Participants with reasonable CE
The results are similar as without the restriction.
Next, we impose the restriction where subjects in the FOSD task chose the second option,
not the first, no matter what threshold given.
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Figure 15: Participants with reasonable FOSD response
4.5 Are people indifferent at X = CE? No First, we make the albeit rough ap-
proximation that indifference between Act I and Act II obtains when individuals report
indifference at CE ± 1 or if CE ∈ {S − 1.96 · SD([CE − S]);S + 1.96 · SD([CE − S])}
(where S is the switching point). More precisely, S is the average value between the last
A/B and first B/A for single-switchers. SD is calculated for [CE − S]. This means that
under the null hypothesis that everyone has CE = S, we treat any difference between CE
and S as measurement error. In other words, subjects are classified as indifferent when they
are indifferent at their CE (and two neighboring values) or they have a clear switching point
and their CE lies in the confidence interval of this switching point.
In reality there are people for whom CE strongly differs from S, and thus our confidence
interval is too wide. We therefore may overestimate the number of people who are indifferent.
The tabulation indicates there exists many people for whom CE strongly differs from S:
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Count Share in %
Indifferent 49 53.8
Non-indifferent 42 46.2
Total 91 100
Figure 16: Indifference (All participants)
Count Share in %
Indifferent 48 71.6
Non-indifferent 19 28.4
Total 67 100
Figure 17: Indifference (Participants without multiple switches)
Count Share in %
Indifferent 21 53.8
Non-indifferent 18 46.2
Total 39 100
Figure 18: Indifference (Participants with 4 ≤ CE ≤ 10 and satisfying FOSD)
Count Share in %
CE inside switch interval 20 46.5
CE outside switch interval 23 53.5
Total 43 100
Figure 19: Indifference (whether CE is inside Machina switching point interval)
We also present the number of observations for specific combinations of CE and S values:
CE<10 CE=10 CE>10
S<10 14 4 4
S=10 1 1 0
S>10 5 6 9
Figure 20: 2x2 table of CE vs. Switching point
4.6 What are people choosing at X = CE? Next, we examine what subjects
choose when X is their certainty equivalent.
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Figure 21: All participants
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Figure 22: Single-Switchers with 4 ≤ CE ≤ 10 and satisfying FOSD
In both samples, we see that indifference obtains for a minority of subjects. Ambiguity at
low outcomes is also somewhat preferred.
4.7 CE vs. Switching point To understand the subjects better, we next visualize
how separated are their CE and switching points. We plot the CE on the x-axis and the
switching point on the y-axis. In each subplot, the 45 degree line is the CE = S line. This
sample includes people who always prefer A or always prefer B (their switching point is
represented as 20). Each subplot presents a different sample. Clockwise from the upper left:
(i) All participants, (ii) CE ∈ [4, 10], (iii) FOSD, (iv) both. From the number of observations,
we can see that the subjects who had CE ∈ [4, 10] also satisfied FOSD.
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Figure 23: CE vs. Switching point (raw data)
A slightly different visual representation folds the data over the 45 degree line. We fold the
data because we do not want to average the responses of some subjects who switch above
their CE and other subjects who switch below their CE.
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Figure 24: CE vs. Switching point (folded)
This graphical representation corroborates the first result—the null hypothesis of indiffer-
ence at X = CE appears to be rejected. Linking this result to the theory would suggest that
prominent theories of ambiguity aversion should be rejected.
The final visualization adds a regression line and replaces the some dots with bars when
subjects report indifference for a range rather than the data indicating a switching point.
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Figure 25: CE vs. Switching point (folded, with regression line)
On this evidence, the confidence interval for the regression line excludes the 45 degree
line for the entire set of participants, but in smaller, more ‘rational’ subsamples, the null
hypothesis of indifference cannot be rejected.
4.8 Testing for equality of CE and S According to models of ambiguity aversion
discussed by Machina, subjects should be indifferent when X = CE. This may mean that
they prefer one option below/above their CE and switch to the other option after X crosses
their CE. We want to check if this really happens, i.e., whether among subjects who switch,
the switch occurs at their CE (elicited in task 2).
In this test, only subjects with a single switching point are analyzed. This means that if, in
the sequence of subjects’ reported choices, A appears first and B appears later, there is no A
after the first B (or symmetrically, if B appears first and A appears later, there is no B after
the first A). The switching point is calculated as the average value between the position of
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last A/B and first B/A. Option “C” (“I am indifferent”) is treated as neutral here: if the last
A choice occurs at X = 7 and first B choice at X = 11 and there are “C”s in-between, then
S is calculated to be equal to 9.
All subjects in the experiment have their CE from task 2, but only some subjects—those
who switch just once—have an S. We only analyze the subsample with subjects with S
available.
4.8.1. Paired T-test
In the paired T-test of equality of means of CE and S, we cannot reject the null hypothesis
that CE and S are equal. This supports the claim that subjects are indifferent at their CE
level.
Variable Obs Mean Std Dev
Switching point 44 10.19 3.34
CE 44 10.53 3.16
H0: mean(Switching Point - CE) = 0; p-value for two-sided test: 0.5162
Figure 26: Paired T-test
4.8.2. Sign rank test for matched samples
As in Snedecor and Cochran (1989):
Number of negative comparisons 21
Number of positive comparisons 22
Number of tied comparisons 1
Two-sided p-value 1
Figure 27: Sign rank test
4.8.3. Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test (for sample with single switching point)
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for equality of distribution for CE and S (unmatched sam-
ples):
Number of observations 44
Expected sum for the first group 1958
Actual sum 1972.5
Z-statistic .121
Figure 28: Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
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4.8.4. Testing whether mean of absolute value of CE and S difference is 0:
T-test for hypothesis that the mean of abs(CE − S) is 0:
Number of observations 44
t-statistic 7.808
p-value 0
Figure 29: T-test
4.9 Allais and Machina paradoxes Next, we present sub-sample analysis, dividing
subjects by whether they are Allais consistent or inconsistent. Indifference appears to depend
on the answer to Allais (see the questionnaire in the appendix). Among subjects who only
switch once, those who are more Allais consistent are more likely to be indifferent.
Figure 30: Allais and Machina paradoxes
Next, we treat multiple switchers as indifferent. For single switchers, we treat them the
same as in the approach described above: people who switch once are treated as indifferent
or non-indifferent.
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Figure 31: Allais and Machina paradoxes (multiple switches interpreted as indifference)
Now we observe a substantial majority of subjects being indifferent, especially when they
are Allais consistent.
4.10 Does order matter for switch direction? The order of the lottery presenta-
tion was randomized, but we can check if the order influenced the switch direction. We find
that the answer is yes, but people still generally switch from Ambiguity at Low to Ambiguity
at High.
Fraction of switches from Risk at Low Outcome to Risk at High Outcome depending on
the order of options on the answer sheet (normal order lists Risk at High Outcome first).
Group Obs Mean Std Dev
Normal Order 32 .13 .34
Reversed order 11 .18 .4
H0: means are equal; p-value for two-sided test: 0.648
Figure 32: Order and switch direction
The tabulation indicates that the fraction of switches from Ambiguity at High to Ambiguity
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at Low depends on the order of options on the answer sheet (normal order lists Ambiguity
at Low Outcome first). But even with the reversed order, the majority of subjects switch
from Ambiguity at Low to Ambiguity at High.
4.11 Predictions about direction of switch Consider Dillenberger and Segal (2013).
The value of Acts are computed as the weighted average of values of first-stage lotteries, with
weights being subjective probabilities of different states of the world: BB,BW,WW .
WAct I = qBB · VAct I(BB) + qBWVAct I(BW ) + qWWVAct I(WW )
WAct II = qBB · VAct II(BB) + qBWVAct II(BW ) + qWWVAct II(WW )
Since terms for state BW are the same for both urns (same payoffs), we may neglect them
for comparison purposes. Let’s now take Gul’s disappointment aversion model with β as the
disappointment aversion parameter:
VAct I(BB) =
2
3
(1 + β) · 0 + 1
3
· 100
1 + 2
3
β
=
100
3 + 2β
VAct I(WW ) =
2
3
(1 + β) ·X + 1
3
· 100
1 + 2
3
β
=
100 + 2(1 + β)X
3 + 2β
VAct II(BB) =
1
3
(1 + β) · 0 + 2
3
·X
1 + 1
3
β
=
2X
3 + β
VAct II(BB) =
1
3
(1 + β) · 0 + 2
3
· 100
1 + 1
3
β
=
200
3 + β
So Act I is preferred to Act II if:
qBB
100(1+β)
3+2β
+ qWW
100+2(1+β)X
3+2β
> qBB
2X(1+β)
3+β
+ qWW
200
3+β
For qWW = qBB (assuming equal probabilities of having two black balls or two white
balls)4: 100β > 2Xβ
4Derivation:
100(1 + β)
3 + 2β
+
100 + 2(1 + β)X
3 + 2β
>
2X(1 + β)
3 + β
+
200
3 + β
· (3 + β)(3 + 2β)
2(1 + β)(3 + β)100 + 2(1 + β)(3 + β)X > (3 + 2β)2X(1 + β) + 200(3 + 2β)
600 + 300β + 6X(1 + β) + 200β + 100β2 + 2X(1 + β)β > 600 + 6X(1 + β) + 400β + 4X(1 + β)β
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We now divide by β. Let’s first assume that β > 0:
50 > X
So if X < 50, Act I is preferred over Act II. Therefore, as X increases we should observe
a switch from Act I to Act II, which is what we find.
If we now go back and assume that β < 0:
50 < X
So if X > 50, Act I is preferred over Act II. Therefore, as X increases we should observe
a switch from Act II to Act I.
5 Conclusion
The Machina thought experiment is the latest in a series of seminal thought experiments
to push the frontiers of both theoretical and empirical research on choice under uncertainty.
Machina offers a test of major theories that allow for ambiguity non-neutrality. In Machina’s
thought experiment, major theories of ambiguity aversion predict indifference, so the thought
experiment is posed as a test of these theories. We make two observations. First, probabilis-
tically sophisticated non-Expected Utility (non-EU) decision makers (DM) can fail to be
indifferent. We present an example (disappointment aversion) where decision makers have a
strict preference. Second, any non-probabilistically sophisticated Expected Utility decision
maker is indifferent. We show that for any prior, someone who satisfies the independence
axiom will be indifferent. Machina’s thought experiment appears at least as much a test
of independence as of ambiguity aversion. A challenge with Machina’s thought experiment
is that it requires knowledge of a subject’s certainty equivalent, which we overcome with
the PRINCE method. Many theories of ambiguity aversion give a sharp point prediction
in Machina’s thought experiment. Is the point prediction of indifference about right? Our
results—across three experiments—indicate no. We find a strong pattern in which way peo-
ple shift. This shift is used to support Dillenberger and Segal (2013)’s axiomitization of
ambiguity aversion and reject other axiomitizations.
Ambiguity aversion is now used to explain puzzles and promote policies. Financial economists,
e.g. Erbas and Mirakhor (2007) and Maenhout (2004), attribute part of the equity premium
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to aversion to ambiguity. Health economists interested in targeting public health initiatives
could base their policies on correlations found between measures of ambiguity aversion and
unhealthy behavior (Sutter et al., 2013). In law, the concept of ambiguity aversion appears
to have made the most headway. Ambiguity aversion is argued to result in plea bargaining
that is too harsh, as defendants are typically more ambiguity averse than the prosecutor who
also faces a repeated situation. The criminal process therefore is systematically affected by
asymmetric ambiguity aversion, which the prosecution can exploit by forcing defendants into
harsh plea bargains, as Segal and Stein (2005) contend. Uncertain risks surrounding environ-
mental protection and medical malpractice have led to calls to provide more scientific data
to ameliorate the relevance of ambiguity aversion in individuals’ policy preferences, e.g., by
Viscusi and Zeckhauser (2006) and Farber (2010). And the theory and practice of statutory
interpretation is rife with ambiguity, as Farnsworth et al. (2010) argue. Ambiguity aversion
has also been applied to contracts (Talley, 2009) and tax compliance (Lawsky, 2013). Yet
little is known at the present time about ambiguity non-neutrality. Conventional wisdom now
seems to be that people are ambiguity-neutral or -averse, but even that statement cannot
be defended any more, as Halevy (2007) finds that in his sample half of the subjects are
ambiguity-averse, but a remarkable 35% ambiguity-seeking. Thus, more research is needed
to find out more about ambiguity attitudes.
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